Constitutional Basis of the Right to Tax and the Taking by Eminent Domain in Indiana by Bell, Julius R.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 3 Article 8
3-1-1932
Constitutional Basis of the Right to Tax and the
Taking by Eminent Domain in Indiana
Julius R. Bell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Julius R. Bell, Constitutional Basis of the Right to Tax and the Taking by Eminent Domain in Indiana, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 359 (1932).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol7/iss3/8
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO
TAX AND THE TAKING BY EMINENT
DOMAIN IN INDIANA
It is an established principle of constitutional law that
private property cannot be taken by virtue of the power of
eminent domain or by the exercise of the power of taxation
for other than public purposes. This rule of law is usually
based upon provisions found in the American constitutions.
However, the constitutions do not designate the particular
objects for which these powers should be exercised. On the
contrary it is a question for the court to determine in each
particular case, whether the powers are exercised for public
use or benefit. To ascertain just what objects the courts
of Indiana have had an occasion to hold to be for public
purposes under the constitution is the aim of this study.
I.
The constitution of 1816 provided "That no man's par-
ticular services shall be demanded, or property taken or ap-
plied to public use, without the consent of his representa-
tives, or without a just compensation .. " 1 The consti-
tution of 1851 contains in substance the provisions of the
former constitution. The present constitution provides
".... No man's property shall be taken by law without just
compensation; nor, except in the case of the state, without
such compensation first assessed and tendered." 2 The prov-
ision of the former constitution of 1816 having been con-
sidered and construed by the courts, the present constitu-
tion is impressed with that construction.'
In accordance with the Indiana constitution, it has always
been held that private property can only be taken under the
1 CONST. OF 1816, ART. I, § 7.
2 CONST. op 1851, ART. I, § 21.
S Stay v. Indiana, etc., Power Co., 166 Ind. 316 (19d6); Gellispie v. State,
168 Ind. 298 (1907); Sexauer v. Star Milling Co., 175 Ind. 342 (1910).
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power of eminent domain when such appropriation is for a
public use.4 Furthermore, the constitutional limitations
against taking private property for public purpose without
compensation by necessary implication prohibits taking pri-
vate property for a private purpose,' and the taking of pri-
vate property for a private purpose is also a deprivation of
private property without due process of law 6 in violation
of the federal constitution.7
That part of the Indiana constitution which provides
that no man's property shall be taken by law without com-
pensation does not extend to the power of taxation.' How-
ever, the power of taxation is essential to the existence of the
government and it is therefore inherent in the state. It is
a legislative power and is limited only by the provisions of
the constitution.9  The constitution of Indiana provides
that "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and shall
prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just 'valuation
for taxation of all property, both real and personal, except-
ing such only, for municipal, educational, literary, scien-
tific, religious or charitable purposes, as may be especially
exempted by law." "0 Local laws authorizing taxation are
prohibited by provisions in the constitution dealing with
local and special laws." But it has been decided that these
constitutional provisions do not prohibit local taxation for
objects in themselves local.' 2  They require a general uni-
4 Great Western C2o. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557, 66 N. E. 765 (1903);
Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 13 Am. Rep. 399 (1873); Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind.
331 (1874).
5 20 C. J. 548 and cases cited.
6 10 R. C. L. 17 and cases cited.
7 ". . . -nor shall any state deprive any person . . . of property without due
process of law .. ." CONST. oF T-HE U. S., 14 AMEND., § 1. The state constitu-
tion of Indiana also limits the exercise of these powers. ART. I, § 21.
8 Wright v. House, 121 N. E. 433 (1919); State v. Richcreek, 167 Ind. 217,
119 Am. St. Rep. 49 (1906); Hanley v. Sims, 175 Ind. 345 (1910).
9 State v. Halter, 149 Ind. 292, 47 N. E. 665 (1897).
10 CONST. OF IND. (1851) ART. 10, § 1.
11 CONST. OF I,. (1851) ART. 4, § § 22 and 23.
12 City of Lafayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70 (1857).
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form levy for state purposes, but they do not prohibit local
taxation under general laws.13
By virtue of the provisions in the constitution in regard
to the taxing power, the legislature provided that "All taxes
levied and collected under this act, less any expense of col-
lection shall be paid in to the state treasury of the state for
the use of the state, and shall be applicable to the expenses
of the state government, and to other purposes such as the
legislature may by law direct." 14
In accordance with the above constitutional and statutory
provisions the court has decided that property may be taken,
through the taxing power for public use.' But the court
recognizes a distinction between the general poWers of tax-
ation for purposes which, as citizens or inhabitants of either
the state or the smaller territorial divisions, all are generally
interested, and the assessments for improvements resulting
in a special benefit to property, and therefore reasonably and
justly chargeable with the expenses of them. The founda-
tion of each power rests in the inherent power of a govern-
ment to tax the people for its support.16 Accordingly it is
not unusual for the legislature in the exercise of the general
powers of taxation, to create a special taxing district and to
levy a tax on all property within such district by a uniform
rule, according to its value for the purpose of aiding in the
construction of public local improvements.
Under the old constitution internal improvements could
be carried on by means of loans creating a state debt. 7 The
provisions in the constitution of 1851 admit the power of the
state to construct works of internal improvements, but for-
13 Bank v. City of Albany, 11 Ind. 139 (1858).
14 BuRN's ANN. IND. STAT., REV. OF 1914, § 10143ai.
IS City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74 (1857); Board of Com'rs., etc., v.
State, ex. rel. Brown, 147 Ind. 492 (1896) ; State v. Richcreek, op. cit. supra note
8; Staine v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361 (1907); Hanley v. Sims, op. cit. supra note 8.
16 Law v. Turnpike Co., 30 Ind. 77 (1868).
17 City of Aurora v. West, op. cit. supra note 15.
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bids the state, in its state capacity, to create a debt for this
purpose. Internal improvements must be paid for by taxes
raised as the work progresses. This is an express limita-
tion on the exercise of the power of the state inserted in the
constitution.'" The prohibition in the constitution upon
the legislature to create a state debt does not prohibit that
body from authorizing cities to create debts, but they pro-
hibit the state from assuming any debts cities may con-
tract. 9 And the constitution concedes the power to coun-
ties to subscribe for stock in companies incorporated to con-
struct works of internal improvements providing payment is
made in cash at the time.20
The construction and maintenance of internal improve-
ments of the state have always been legitimate subjects to
call into exercise the powers of taxation and eminent do-
21 teVmain. In the course of the opinion in Rubottom v.
M'Clure 22 the court said:
"It is presumed that at the present day, no one will question the
right of the legislature to apply the property of individuals to public
use, when 'urgent necessity' or 'the general interest' may require it."
The court was considering in this case a question of secur-
ing materials necessary for the maintenance of internal im-
provements.
II.
"The public necessity and convenience have always in-
dicated highways as one of the objects for which the state
might take private property." 23 There seems to be no
18 See CoNsT. o IND., ART. 10, § 5.
19 City of Aurora v. West, op. cit. supra note 15.
20 CONST. ore IND., ART. 10, § 6.
21 See for example, State v. Marion County, 82 N. E. 482 (Ind. 1907);
Wright v. House, op. cit. supra note 8; Droneberger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420 (1858);
Rudisell v. State, 40 Ind. 485 (1872); Rubottom v. M'Clure, 4 Blackf. SS
(1838); City of Aurora v. West, op. cit. supra note 15; Cook Investment Co. v.
Evansville, 175 Ind. 3, 93 N. E. 279 (1910).
22 Op. cit. supra note 21, p. 506.
23 Droneberger v. Reed, op. cit. supra note 21 (A supervisor of a road district
entered upon adjoining land to obtain materials for the repair of a highway. The
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question about the constitutionality of taking private prop-
erty for public roads. However, the courts distinguish be-
tween public and private roads. One for the use of the
public which is usually constructed and maintained at public
expense. The other is for the use of the particular persons
for whose benefit it is located and must be maintained at
their expense. A private road is not for and its use cannot
be demanded by the public. While it is true that the con-
struction of public roads sustains the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, no person 24 or group of persons 25 have
the right to have a private road opened and maintained over
the land owned by another person, even at their own ex-
pense. But the fact that a road is of special benefit or ad-
vantage to certain individuals is not sufficient to declare it
a private road. In the Glendenning v. Stahley case 26 it was
insisted that the convenience necessary to the taking of pri-
vate property for a public road must be public convenience
and not a convenience to certain individuals. It appeared
from the eVidence that the proposed road would facilitate
the convenience of one or more persons over that of others.
In view of this fact it was contended that the road would
not be a public utility. The court did not attempt to give
a complete definition of the terms "public utility" or "con-
venience" as used in connection with the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. But the dominant idea advanced
appears to be that the special advantage or convenience of
the road to certain individuals cannot destroy its public
character. This proposition is sound for the reason that
exercise of the power of eminent domain for this purpose was sustained). See
also Rubottom v. M'Clure, op. cit. supra note 21, wherein it was said: "... . our
own statutes regulating the location and opening of highways, both under the
territorial governments and ever since we became a state, have embraced the
same principle. They contemplate that individual property--even cultivated
fields---may be entered upon by the proper agents for the purpose of viewing,
locating, and marking routes for public roads . . !"
24 Wild v. Deig, op. cit. supra note 4; Logan v. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372,
24 N. E. 190 (1890); Stewart v. Hartman, op. cit. supra note 4.
25 Blackman v. Halves, 72 Ind. 515 (1880).
26 173 Ind. 674, 91 N. E. 234 (1910).
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some roads provide special means and facilities of access to
and from certain property, making the benefit in a special
sense different from that resulting to the general public.
Therefore it is not essential that every citizen have a par-
ticular interest in a road before it can be said that it is re-
quired for public use. On the contrary however, if the
public use or benefit to be derived from an outlet from prop-
erty is incidental to the private use the power of eminent do-
main cannot be exercised.27 Obviously it is impossible to
determine the exact number of persons required to derive
benefits from a road before it can be said to be invested with
a public interest.28  However, the legislature has no author-
ity to provide for the construction of roads which are for
the private use of an individual alone or constructed by pri-
vate expense and not open to the public.2 ' This kind of a
road is not a public highway for which private property may
be taken. In Blackman v. Halves 30 a number of persons
petitioned the board of county commissioners for a change
in a public highway. The reviewers appointed to report on
the petition advised against the proposed change because
27 Kessler v. Indianapolis, 157 N. E. 547 (1927). In this case it was held
that a city cannot condemn private property adjoining a boulevard notwith-
standing contingent prospective benefit to the city.
28 In Kissinger v. Hanselman, 33 Ind. 80 (1870), the court decided that
a neighborhood road for the purpose of having access to a burial ground
is not a private road. The petition to the commissioners to have the road
opened was signed and prhsented by twenty-three citizens of the township.
In upholding the condemnation proceeding and answering the objection that
a neighborhood road is only a private road the court said: "If that be so,
then half the highways in Indiana are of that class-void in their inception,
if, as the appellant contends, the right of eminent domain cannot he exercised
to take land for them . . ." .-This case holds that such roads are public high-
ways and the question whether the right of eminent, domain may be exercised
to take private property for a private road is not applicable to them. This rule
was not followed in later cases. For example see Wild v. Deig, op. cit. supra
note 4; Stewart v. Hartman, op. cit. supra note 4; Logan v. Stogsdale, op. cit.
supra note 24.
29 See for example Wild v. Deig, op. cit. supra note 4; Stewart v. Hartman,
op. cit. supra note 4; Blackman v. Halves, op. cit. supra note 25; Logan v.
Stogsdale, op. cit. supra note 24.
30 Op. cit. supra note 25. (The petitioner and eighteen other persons of the
neighborhood petitioned for the change in the location of the highway.)
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the petitioner (the one most interested in the road) proposed
to open and maintain the new road which the change peti-
tioned for would make necessary, at his own expense. For
this reason the reviewers maintained that the road would
not be of public utility. The court said in this case:
"The principles governing the private rights of land-owners . . . lead
to what appears to us to be the inevitable conclusion, that no person
has the right to open and maintain a highway over the land of
another without his consent, where such highway has been found not
to be of public utility. The right of eminent domain can only be
invoked for the compulsory taking or the enforced appropriation of
private property when some public exigency requires the exercise of
that sovereign right. When a highway, petitioned for, has been found
not to be needed for public use, it can not be said that any public
exigency requires that it shall be opened and maintained."
In an earlier case in which the main question was the con-
stitutionality of a law authorizing the location of private
roads the court said:
"Concede that the public exigency requires that a way should be
opened to every man's farm, and that the State may and should
provide for the establishment of a public road or highway, to enable
every citizen to discharge his duties, and travel to and from his farm;
it does not follow that such ways should be private and owned by
the party applying for them. If it would be of public utility to estab-
lish the road, then it should be a highway. If not, the right of eminent
domain cannot be exercised to establish it. It is not the amount of
travel, the extent of the use of a highway, by the public, that dis-
tinguishes it from a private way or road. It is the right to so use or
travel upon it, not its exercise." s1
In Logan v. Stogsdale 32 an act which provided for the estab-
lishment of branch highways and gave to any freeholder
who had no outlet to a highway, the right to petition for
one was declared to be unconstitutional on the ground that
it assumed to authorize the seizure of the property of one
citizen for the benefit of another. The petitioner's land in
31 Wild v. Deig, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 461. (Condemnation proceeding to
obtain land to establish this road was not sustained). See also Stewart v. Hart-
man, op. cit. supra note 4.
32 Op. cit. supra note 24. (The petitioner was successful in securing a way
of necessity.)
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this case was surrounded on all sides by the land of other
persons and was completely shut off from any highway. It
was impossible to go to or from it without passing over ad-
joining land. But the court said:
".. . the Legislature intended to grant a freeholder who is shut off
from a highway a right to secure a way across, the land of another
upon the payment of damages. It is not made essential that the way
shall be one required by the public, for the whole scope and tenor of
the act was intended to secure a right of way -to private property
* owners.
"As the act assumes to authorize the seizure of the property of
one citizen for the benefit of another, it can not be upheld."
However, the petitioner in this case was successful in secur-
ing an out-let to a highway, as a "way of necessity."
There can be no doubt that public highways are of such
general benefit as to warrant their construction at govern-
mental expense by the exercise of the power of taxation. 8
In fact the Supreme Court of Indiana has said 11 that "The
power to construct and maintain public highways is a gov-
ernmental function, the same as the power to build school-
houses and support schools or to build courthouses and jails,
or to construct and maintain asylums for the insane or for
the dependent poor .... The Legislature may likewise em-
power any of the governmental subdivisions of the state
to levy and collect taxes for similar purposes in the exercise
of their delegated governmental powers." The repair of
highways is also for a governmental purpose which supports
the exercise of the power of taxation, the same as a tax to
support and maintain the different departments of govern-
ment of the state."3 It appears that no question has ever
been made relative to the use of the taxing power to con-
struct and maintain private roads. But in Gilson v. Board
33 See State v. Marion County, op. cit. supra note 21; Wright v. House,
op. cit. supra note 8.
34 Wright v. House op. cit. supra note 8 at p. 436.
35 State v. Marion County, op. cit. supra note 21.
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of Commissioners "I an act which provides for the purchase
of a privately owned toll road was upheld. For the pur-
pose of raising money to purchase the road the board of
commissioners was required to levy an annual tax upon the
property of the township voting to make the purchase. The
court said in this case:
"In the passage of the statute under examination the legislature took
into consideration that those living in the immediate vicinity of a
toll road had a special interest in having it made free, and that they
would reap an advantage therefrom not enjoyed by those residing
in a remote part of the county, and hence it imposed upon those
who thus received a special benefit the burden of paying for the same
in the event they desired to purchase such road, and make it free.
There can be no difference in principle between taxation to construct
a free gravel road and taxation to purchase a toll road already con-
structed, and make it free to all."
III.
The construction of railroads to provide means of trans-
portation and inter-communication, to facilitate the social
and business relations of the people and to develop natural
resources of the state always has been one of the objects of
special interest to the government. The constitutional pow-
er of the Legislature in Indiana to impose a tax upon the
people to aid in the construction of railroads and other in-
ternal improvements has undergone a thorough and elabo-
rate discussion."' The provisions in the constitution in this
connection admit the power of the state to construct work
of internal improvement but forbid it to create a debt for
the purpose." In John v. the Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. 39
it was said:
"The state being -authorized to build railroads, it follows that it may
levy a tax, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution for
that purpose.'
36 128 Ind. 65 (1890).
37 See for example, City of Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38 (1854); City of
Aurora v. West, op. cit. supra note 15. (A very able discussion of the history
of Internal Improvement in Indiana.) See The Lafayette, Muncie, and Bloom-
ington R. R. Co. and Another v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185 (1870).
8 City of Aurora v. West, op. cit. supra note 15.
39 35 Ind. 539 (1871).
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There is no case on record which challenges the constitu-
tionality of a state tax levied for this purpose. But the
constitutionality of the question has been fully considered
in cases relative to the powers of municipalities to exercise
the power of taxation to aid in the construction of railroads.
In City of Aurora v. West,40 a case which involved a suit
brought to recover the interest on bonds issued by a city for
this purpose, it was held that a city could subscribe for stock
in a railroad corporation when the act of incorporation con-
ferred such power. It was said in this case:
"It has been suggested, that taxation to pay the indebtedness sued
upon, is the taking of private property for public use; and the sug-
gestion is true. And it is the important fact in the case which renders
the taking legal.
"That charter (of the City of Aurora) specifies the roads in which
the city may take stock, viz., those running to the city. And inde-
pendently of the fact that the charter itself is confirmed by the
constitution, we cannot say, in opposition to the judgment of the
legislature of the state and people of city, that such road may not
be of such local interest to the whole city as to justify the exercise
of the taxing power of the corporation, over the persons and property
of the citizens of the city, to aid in their constructions.
"We think, also, that a company chartered to build a railroad
is chartered to build a road. We think a railroad is a road as properly
as a turnpike road ...is a road. .. "
In considering the taking of private property by con-
demnation proceedings for the construction of railroads, the
test appears to be, is the proposed use a public one? "' If
the use for which the property is taken is for the convenience
and benefit of the public private corporations constructing
and operating railroads have the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain.42 "It is not a question of how many
40 Op. cit. supra note 15, affirmed in Thompson v. City of Peru, 29 Ind. 305
(1868).
41 F. W. Cook Investment Co. v. Evansville, 175 Ind. 3 (1910).
42 Reitz v. Evansville Terminal R. R. Co., 175 Ind. 707, 93 N. E. 283 (1910).
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persons use the facilities and upon the same analogy it is
immaterial that other facilities exist a few miles away. It
is not a question of degree of public utility that determines
the character of the use, but of choice by the carrier in fur-
nishing greater and better facilities for the public use, and
is determined by the right of the public to use it without
discrimination and not by the extent to which it may be
used or by the fact that other equal facilities exist at more
remote distance. Equal facilities are as much required at
one place as at another." 13 This statement was made in
a case which upheld the taking of property, outside of the
right of way previously taken, for the location and main-
tenance of stock pens. A railroad company as a common
carrier is required to carry live stock. Consequently the
construction and maintenance of stock pens is an indispen-
sable necessity to furnish facilities for loading and unloading
and to enable the companies to perform their public duties.
For the same reason property may be taken for- depots as
well as for roads of which they are a necessary part." When
a station is established, the duty to provide facilities and
accept and transport freight is imperative.
In a case which involved proceedings to prevent the ap-
propriation of land for the construction of a side track from
the main .line to privately owned land containing building
stone, the court held such an appropriation was for a public
use.45 The purpose of the side track was to connect the
main line of the railroad with a market for building stone.
In answer to the contention that this was a private use for
which property cannot be condemned, the court said:
43 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Baugh, 175 Ind. 419, 94 N. E. 571 (1911).
44 Protzman v. The Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 9 Ind. 467, 68 Am. Dec. 650
(1857).
45 Bedford Quarries Co. v. Chicago, etc., Co., 175 Ind. 303 (1911). See
also Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas, 175 Ind. 319 (1911); Cottrell v. Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 192 Ind. 692, 138 N. E. 504 (1923); Sisters of Providence v. Lower
Vein Coal Co., 198 Ind. 645, 154 N. E. 659 (1926).
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".. . the proposed side track when constructed will be open to the
public use, and subject to public control in all respects, as its other
tracks are open to public use. Said side track will be open to all who
are so situated as to be able to use it, upon equal terms and must
therefore be regarded as a public, and not a private, use. The pro-
posed side track is not to be constructed for the sole purpose of
furnishing an outlet for the business of one quarry. It is the ex-
tension of a track now reaching a quarry .... It is to be constructed
over land which is underlaid with a good quality of stone, which can
only be marketed by having a railroad track built upon and across
the same.
"The public generally is interested in these quarries being opened,
and this stone land being developed; the country at large in the price
of stone; and the particular locality in the development of the resources
of the County. Appellee has a main line of railroad built through
that territory which is naturally expected to serve that locality, and
it is a part of its business to provide such facilities as must be had,
in order for this business to be accommodated."
IV.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has uniformly held that
the construction and maintenance of ditches and other facili-
ties for drainage purposes authorized by the drainage laws
of the state are for a public and not for private use.4" The
essential elements required to give a public character to
drainage prospects are that the work will either promote
the public health or improve a public highway or be of pub-
lic utility." However, it is not necessary for a drainage
system to promote all three of these elements before the
court will sustain it. If it is found that either of the propo-
sitions will be promoted, the construction of the drain is
to be regarded an improvement of such a public character
as to warrant its construction.4" In Anderson v. Kerns
Draining Co.,4" one of the earliest cases in which the con-
46 Poundstone v. Baldwin, 145 Ind. 139, 44 N. E. 191 (1896).
47 Heick v. Voight, 110 Ind. 279, 11 N. E. 306 (1887) ; Anderson v. Baker,
98 Ind. 587 (1884); Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79 (1884); Chambers v. Kyle, 67
Ind. 206 (1879); Wishmier v. State, 97 Ind. 160 (1884).
48 Heick v. Voight, op. cit. supra note 47.
49 14 Ind. 199 (1860).
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struction of drains was involved, the court held that the
reclamation of wet lands, and the draining of the marshes
and ponds is of public utility and is conducive to the public
health and convenience, for the promotion of which taxes
may be levied. But the court also pointed out that "the
draining of a man's farm, simply to render it more valuable
to the owner, would not be a work of public utility in the
constitutional sense of the term . .'. though the public and
adjoining proprietors might be, in a substantial degree, bene-
fited by the operation, and forceable taxation to pay for the
benefit would hardly be tolerated."
A petition for the construction of a drainage ditch was
sustained in Ross v. Davis 10 over the objection that the
provisions for the constructions of drains made in the stat-
ute were intended for private benefit only. This objection
was based on the fact that proceedings for the construction
of drains could be commenced only by an owner of land
which would be benefited by drainage. The objection was
answered in another provision of the statute which required
the petitioner to state that the proposed drains would be of
public utility or improve public highways. The court, how-
ever, said:
"It is not necessary in order that the use may be regarded as public,
that the whole community or any large portion of it may participate
in it. If the drain be of public benefit, the fact that some individuals
may be specially -benefited above others affected by it will not deprive
it of its public character."
If a particular ditch will drain a considerable amount of
wet land, it is of public utility and benefit.5 This of course
is an application of the more liberal doctrine of "public use"
interpreted to mean "public advantage." That is a com-
munity is benefited by any drainage project which makes
land suitable for habitation and agricultural purposes, and
50 97 Ind. 79 (1884).
51 Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 782 (1889).
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adds to their taxable value. The same is true of drainage
projects which tend to prevent disease.
An interesting case in connection with drainage is that of
Valparaiso v. Hagen."- This case involved the following set
of facts. A city constructed a complete sewer system, adapt-
ing for its outlet a low-lying marsh which drained into a
stream which in turn was the only natural and practicable
drainage outlet for all the surrounding territory. The city
arranged to extend the outlet for its sewage through the
marsh to the stream. The owner and occupants of the land
abutting on the stream below the city brought an action for
an injunction to prevent the city from discharging sewage
into the stream. They contended that the stream which at
one time was a natural running stream of pure water, used
by them for domestic and dairy purposes had already be-
come polluted, filthy and unwholesome; and that the exten-
sion of the sewer through the marsh to the stream would
greatly increase the pollution of the water and make it un-
fit for any purpose, "and that this is a consequential dam-
age, not to the natural rights in the stream, but to the ac-
quired property rights; and that it is a taking of his private
property for a public use without compensation first being
rendered." In answer to this argument, the court held that
when the construction of public improvements sanctioned
by law are "skillfully executed and free from negligence,"
cities are not liable for the resulting consequential damages
to private property. Such damages as lowering the value
of property by the destruction of pastures and the "creation
of personal discomforts is not a taking of private property
as must be preceded by just compensation." The city of
course had the right to exercise the power of eminent domain
to obtain an outlet for its sewage, but it had no authority to
use the power to condemn the stream and margins to re-
lieve consequential damages. "The construction of sewers
52 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. 1062 (1899).
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and outlet is sanctioned by law, and what the law grants
will not constitute a nuisance per se public or private. And,
if the law is obeyed, no objectionable wrong will result...
But it must be presumed that all ministerial officers will per-
form their official duty, and cause no offense in their execu-
tion of the law." The facts did not show that there was
the lack of skill or that some other outlet was more practi-
cable or that the disposal of the sewage could be accom-
plished by some other available method. Hence the re-
quested relief was denied.
V.
The operation of mills for various purposes by water
power has brought the question of public use before the
Supreme Court. Early territorial laws authorized the con-
struction of dams to obtain power from overflowing water
to operate mills. Similar statutes were enacted after the
constitution of 1816 was adopted. The constitutional va-
lidity of these statutes was considered in Hankins v. Law-
rence,53 which involved the right of a canal company to
exercise the power of eminent domain to secure land for a
site for erecting and operating a grist mill, carding machine
and woolen factory. In answering the argument that this
was taking private property for private use, the court said:
"Since the commencement of our state government, we have always
had statutes authorizing writs of ad quod damnum. By virtue of such
writs, persons are enabled to procure the land of others necessary
for the abutment of dams for grist mills, without the owners' consent,
by making compensation. These statutes are supported on the ground
of the benefit of such mills to the public. This Court has repeatedly
and, we have no doubt, correctly, recognized these statutes as valid.
* . .We think, therefore, that the company owning the canal might
be authorized by statute, to take the land mentioned in the plea as
a site for said works, on account of their being of public use ...
The taking of land to be overflowed by a dam to be used
among other purposes to grind and manufacture all kinds
53 8 Blackf. 266 (1846).
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of flour, meal and feed from grain was sustained in Sexauer
v. Star Milling Co.54 The court said in this case:
"The public character of such use has been declared by legislative
enactment, adjudged by this court, and tacitly acknowledged in the
Constitution, and at no time authoritatively denied or questioned. It is
within the common knowledge of the members of this court, as well
as of other men, that the public is not now so vitally dependent
upon the operation of water grist mills as it was in earlier times: but
such of these mills as continue in existence are quasi-public institu-
tions, are in the enjoyment and exercise of a public franchise, and
remain subject to the regulating police power of the State. . . . We
cannot, in view of the well-settled policy of this State, declare that
such use is not of a public character within the meaning of our
Constitution."
While the changing requirements of necessity and public
policy have apparently lessened and eliminated the public
character of some uses, they have caused other uses to be-
come public. This is particularly true in regard to the
question of water power. In Zekner v. Milner " the right
to construct and maintain a dam to obtain water power to
operate a grist mill was secured in 1852 by condemnation
proceedings. When the mill was first put into operation it
was declared to be for a public use or benefit. Later when
the mill was operated almost entirely for private use due to
the fact that it did very little grinding for toll, the dam was
permitted to be taken by drainage commissioner for another
public use to prevent overflows of the river which injured
roads and created pools of water which became a menace to
health.
Utilizing water power to manufacture electricity to be
sold to the public generally now constitutes a public use
for which land may be taken by eminent domain.58 The
54 173 Ind. 342, 90 N. E. 474 (1910).
55 172 Ind. 493, 87 N. E. 209 (1909).
56 Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co., 184 Ind. 370, 111 N. E. 308
(1916); Stoy v. Indiana Hydraulic Co., 166 Ind. 316, 76 N. E. 1067 (1906);
Lowe v. Indiana Hydroelectric Power Co., 197 Ind. 430, 151 N. E. 220 (1926);
Illyes v. White River Light & Power Co., 175 Ind. 118, 93 N. E. 670 (1911).
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court, in Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co.,5" upheld a
condemnation proceeding which had for its purpose the tak-
ing of land to be used for a power site by a corporation to
manufacture and sell to certain cities, private persons and
the general public, electric current for light, heat and pow-
er. The taking of the property was objetted to on the
ground that the corporation was not charged in any man-
ner with the performance of any public duty; that no part
of the public had a right to its services on any terms or con-
ditions. It was contended that taking the property sought
would be in violation of the constitution which forbids the
taking of private property for a private use. It was held
that the statute under which the corporation was incor-
porated did not fix rates or prescribe regulations of service,
but the corporation was bound by common law to impar-
tially serve the public. Consequently the use of the land
for a power site was held a public one.
The taking of land by a street railway company has been
upheld for a proposed electrical transmission line, consist-
ing of poles and wires, for the transmission of electric cur-
rent with the purpose of using it for light and power in
operating its street cars. The objection to the condemna-
tion proceeding was that the contemplated use was not
public but intended only to furnish the company with cheap-
er power and light in the operation of its own cars. The
use in this case, Mull v. Indianapolis & C. Traction Co.,
was held a public one.5"
Electric current is so admiraly adapted for light, power
and heat that its use has had a phenominal growth. It is
the law that the expense of lighting the streets is essential
to the maintenance of corporate existence, and constitutes
current expenses, payable out of the current revenues which
57 Op. cit. supra note 56. See also a fairly recent case, which holds this
same view: Lowe v. Indiana Hydroelectric Power Co., op. cit. supra note 56.
58 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. 657 (1907).
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may be applied to such purposes." ' "The power to light
the streets and public places of a city is one of its implied
and inherent powers, as being necessary to properly protect
the lives and property of its inhabitants and as a check
on immorality." "Wherever men herd together in villages,
towns, or cities will be found more or less of the lawless and
vicious; and crime and vice are plants which flourish best
in the darkness. So far as lighting the streets, alleys and
public places . . . are concerned . . . independently of any
statutory power, the municipal authorities have inherent
power to provide for lighting them." 6o
In the case of Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rushville 61
a statute was considered in so far as it related to the right
of a city to buy and operate a plant and machinery to light
its streets and public places, and it was held that the statute
under which the city was incorporated was sufficient to
confer that power.
The purchase of the necessary land, and material and the
erection and maintenance of a lighting plant involves the
exercise of the taxing power. Because the necessary funds
must be raised by taxing the tax-payers of the municipality
concerned. A city possessing the power to generate and dis-
tribute electricity within its limits for the lighting of streets
and public places may also furnish it to its inhabitants to
light their residences and places of business. This is a legit-
imate exercise of the police power for the preservation of
property and health.6 2
50 Foland v. Town of Frankton, 41 N. E. 1031 (1895). See also Town of
Gosport v. Pritchard, 156 Ind. 400, 59 N. E. 1058 (1901), in which it was said:
"The power of municipal corporations to contract for the lighting of streets is
purely a business power and is discretionary." The authority to contract for
the lighting of the streets and other public places with electric power was
upheld.
60 The City of Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, 28 N. E. 849 (1891).
61 121 Ind. 206, 23 N. E. 72 (1889).
02 The City of Crawfordsville v. Braden, op. cit. supra note 60.
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"The authority to do these things carries with it inciden-
tally the further power to procure or furnish whatever is
necessary for the production and dissemination of the
light." The court recognizes the difference between
electricity and other commodities which can be bought and
transported from place to place. The properties of electric-
ity are such that the facilities required for transportation
are different from that of oil, fuel and food. Electricity
cannot be generated and transported from place to place
in the same manner as these commodities. Transportation
lines, consisting of poles, wires and many other accessories
are required to convey electrical energy from the place where
it is generated to the place where it is used. And the city
has the power to provide for these transportation facilities.
VI.
There are some other important cases involving miscel-
laneous questions in regard to exercising the powers of tax-
ation and eminent domain. "It seems to be settled law that
lands may be condemned for the purpose of a public ceme-
tery, where the public in general have a right to obtain in-
terment, and that lands taken for the purpose of enlarging
a public cemetery is devoting it to a public use.64 In Forne-
man v. The Mount Pleasant Cemetery Association 61 the
land in question was condemned by a corporation owning
and controlling a public cemetery. In the opinion of its
trustees, it had become necessary to enlarge the cemetery
and to secure land for this purpose. The court decided
that this was sufficient to show that the land was condemned
for the purpose of using it for a public cemetery.
In another case the court held invalid a statute giving
chautauqua associations the right to exercise the power of
63 The City of Crawfordsville v. Braden, op. cit. supra note 60.
64 Forneman v. The Mount Pleasant Cemetery Association, 136 Ind. 344, 347
(1893).
65 Op. cit. supra note 64.
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eminent domain as attempting to confer the power on a
private corporation for a purpose not constituting a public
use.6" The statute provided "That any voluntary associa-
tion organized and incorporated for the purpose of estab-
lishing, conducting and maintaining a religious chautauqua
or assembly, which has had a continuous legal existence for
a period of not less than fifteen years, during all of which
period of time such voluntary association has held ... an
annual program covering a period of not less than sixteen
days during each year, and has held a lease on a tract of
timber land for a period of not less than fifteen years, is
hereby endowed with the right of eminent domain insofar
as the same may be necessary for the purpose of acquiring
possession... of the tract of land on which such associa-
tion holds a lease.. ." The statute was held invalid against
the contention of the chautuaqua company that it was "one
of the most prominent and useful societies devoted to the
public service in teaching morality and justice and civil
government, and widening the intellectual horizon of many
thousand men, women, and children . . ." To this argu-
ment the court answered that "'it cannot be insisted that
every organization wielding a public benefit can be endowed
with the power of eminent domain.'" The chautauqua as-
sociation further emphasized "the character, use, and pur-
pose of chautauqua assemblies as an aid to the dissemina-
tion of knowledge." But the court said:
"Granting that chautauqua assemblies as have a great and good
influence on the educational as well as the religious life of the country
by reason of their summer entertainment, lectures, and schools, yet
by reason of the private character of the appellant chautauqua company
and in the absence of any showing that its meetings are for the whole
public or that the general public has the right and the power to
compel appellant to serve it, we cannot see that it is in any different
situation from a private school. Private schools, though admittedly
of value and use to the public, cannot be granted the power of eminent
domain."
66 Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 155 N. E. 465 (Ind. 1927).
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The court held that chautauqua assemblies are not of such
great public concern as to require their operation as a
matter of public policy and that their operation does not
constitute such a public use as will sanction the exercise of
the power of eminent domain in their favor.
In Russell v. Trustees of Purdue University 7 the su-
preme court upheld the right to exercise the power of emi-
nent domain to acquire property upon which to erect and
maintain dormitories for Purdue University. The court re-
viewed a number of cases to support the view that univer-
sities founded and supported by the state are public rather
than private corporations, consequently, dormitories used
in connection with a university to enable it to perform its
duties to the public serves a public use which will sustain
the taking of private property by eminent domain.
More than half a century ago the court upheld that a tax
assessed in a county to pay a debt contracted in securing
the location of Purdue University in the county.18  The
court's decision was based on the fact that "the location of
it in a given county will doubtless confer upon that county
many local benefits of pecuniary value. The parents re-
siding in the county can send their sons and perhaps their
daughters to the college to be educated at a less expenditure
of time and money than would be incurred if it were situated
at a more remote point in the state. The college, with its
professors, tutors, attendants and students, will probably
diffuse much more money throughout the community than
would otherwise circulate. It may also add to the educated
and intelligent population of the place, and be the means
of stimulating the industry and increasing the worth and
moral worth of the community, thereby enhancing the at-
tractions of society and the value of society."
67 168 N. E. 529 (Ind. 1929).
88 Marks, Treasurer of Tippecanoe Co., v. The Trustees of Purdue University,
37 Ind. 155 (1871).
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In a similar case, in which the authority of a municipality
to exercise the taxing power to pay the entire cost of pro-
curing the location of a county seat within its limits and the
erection of the necessary county buildings was questioned,
the court said:"
"The power of taxation must be exercised for a public purpose and'
unless restricted, however, by some provision of fundamental law it
may be exercised or conferred by the legislature to an unlimited
extent. It is certainly a fact and one well recognized that the location
of a county capital seat of justice at a particular town or city and
the erection therein of the necessary county buildings and the admin-
istration, thereat of all the offices or public business of the county,
are matters of public concern, and much to be desired by the in-
habitants of such town or city immediately and especially benefited
thereby in many respects. The location of a county seat therein in
view of all the incidental benefit and advantages derived therefrom by
the citizens of the place in general may certainly be considered of
such benefit to and enhancement of all property therein as under the
circumstances would justify the legislature in its discretion in author-
izing the entire burden of the expense incident to such location to be
laid upon the property of the particular district composed of the
territory within the limits of such municipal corporation by providing
for the discharge of payment thereof by taxes levied upon all the
property in such district subject to taxation."
A very interesting case involving the power of taxation
is that of Trustee McClelland v. The State, ex rel. Speer.70
A township trustee deposited to his personal credit funds
belonging to the township, for use in maintaining the pub-
lic schools. The bank failed and the trustee lost the de-
posit. He repaid all of the money lost, belonging to the
school fund out of "his private means." The legislature
passed an act for the relief of the trustee. Immediately he
demanded payment of the sum which he had made to replace
the amount lost and that a tax be levied sufficient to raise
the amount. The court held that "a public statute cannot
be valid, which is intended to, and does in effect, so tax
69 Schenck v. City of Jeffersonville, 152 Ind. 217, 52 N. E. 212 (1896).
See also Board of Commissioners v. State, 147 Ind. 476, 46 N. E. 908 (1897).
70 138 Ind. 321, 37 N. E. 1089 (1854).
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an individual as to take private property for private use.
It seems, from the record, that the appellee's relator ...
voluntarily made up the money he had lost.., and this be-
ing so, he occupied to his township, as to that money, the
position neither of debtor or creditor. He had no right in
law or in equity to a return of the money, and a return of
it to him would amount to nothing short of a gift. Raising
the funds for that purpose from the various taxpayers of
Wayne township, by tax, would be, in effect, taking the
property of one man to bestow it upon another. It would
be a taking of the property of the citizens of that township
for a private, and not a public use."
VIi.
There are comparatively few Indiana cases in which the
doctrine of public purpose is invoked. By far the greatest
number of objects for which the powers of taxation and
eminent domain are exercised have not been disputed.
Therefore an enumeration of the objects for which these
powers can be used is not possible or practicable. However
they are sovereign powers which the people retain over pri-
vate property to take as much as may be necessary for the
government to accomplish the many public services and
other purposes for which it is maintained. Consequently
they are alike in their source and rest upon the same foun-
dation, the necessities of the public and the objects to be
attained by which the exercise of either can -be sanctioned
by the court for some public purpose or public use.
Public purpose in taxation and public use in eminent do-
main are much the same in importance. When a tax is im-
posed or private property taken a public policy is to be pro-
moted. Public purpose and public use are, to a consider-
able extent, dependent upon public policies which are de-
termined by the legislature changing from time to time to
adopt the best means of promoting the interest of the state.
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These powers are also clearly distinguishable in respect
to the occasion and method of use, compensation secured
to the individual and the manner which they operate upon
a community or a class of persons or an individual. There-
fore a more liberal construction of public purpose is allowed
in eminent domain than in taxation. The reason is obvious.
Eminent domain proceedings affect individuals or only a
few persons at most, and too great liberality in the inter-
pretation of public purpose in eminent domain would be less
harmful and result in less injustice than in taxation. Con-
sequently proceedings under the power of eminent domain
were upheld when land was required for a right of way
to connect a railroad with a stone quarry. The extension
of the side track for this purpose subserved a public use in
bringing valuable building stone to a market. To exercise
the power of taxation for such a purpose would be inadmiss-
able as appropriating public revenues to a private purpose.
The flexible nature of public purpose as dependent upon
social and economic conditions has often been recognized.
The economic situations, especially, are of considerable im-
portance in regard to the use of eminent domain by private
organizations. A case which decided that Chautauqua ac-
tivities are a non-public use lends support to this conclusion,
there being no significant economic consideration involved.
However, the tendency has been to expand the meaning of
public purpose in eminent domain and taxation. It is diffi-
cult, of course, to determine in some cases what constitutes
a public purpose. But it is an error to assume that the
court should not consider the progress and improvements of
the time in drawing the line of distinction between private
and public purposes.
Julius R. Bell.
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